Last update: June 22, 2009
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EAP is the IETF standard for extensible authentication in network access. It is standardized for use within PPP (RFC 2284), wired IEEE 802 networks (IEEE 802.1X), and VPNs (L2TP/IPsec and PIC). Here are pointers to information on the EAP protocol:
EAP (Proposed Standard,
RFC 3748)
EAP
Issues List
EAP state
machine (Informational, RFC 4137)
EAP WG mailing list
archives
How
to develop an EAP method for Windows
EAP methods provide keying material. Here are the documents describing EAP key management.
EAP
Key Management Framework (Proposed Standard, RFC 5247)
MPPE Key Derivation (Informational,
RFC 3079)
Since EAP is extensible there are lots of proposals for authentication methods that work with it. Only some of these methods meet the requirements for use in wireless authentication; others have known security vulnerabilities. Here are the security requirements for EAP methods as laid out by IEEE 802.11i:
EAP method requirements (Informational, RFC 4017)Here are some of the proposed EAP methods:
EAP-TLS (Proposed Standard, RFC 5216)
RSA
SecurID Token Card (Internet Draft, work in progress)
EAP POTP
(Informational, RFC 4793)
Smartcard
EAP Method (Internet Draft, work in progress)
PEAPv2
(Internet Draft, work in progress) ; used with: EAP
MS-CHAP-v2 (Internet Draft, work in progress)
EAP-FAST
(Informational, RFC 4851)
TLS
Session Resumption for EAP-FAST (Proposed Standard, RFC 4507)
EAP-SRP
(Internet Draft, work in progress)
Presentation
on EAP SRP
EAP
Archie (Internet Draft, work in progress)
Presentation
on EAP Archie
EAP-PSK
(Proposed Standard, RFC 4764)
EAP-PAX
(Informational, RFC 4746)
Here is a summary of the known security vulnerabilities of implemented or proposed EAP methods.
Kerberos is vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Here are the details on the vulnerability:
EAP-GSS (Internet Draft, work in progress)Cisco's LEAP protocol is also vulnerable to dictionary attacks, and several LEAP cracking tools are now available. Here are the details on the vulnerability and cracking tools:
ASLEAP cracking toolThe security weaknesses in GSM/GPRS are well known. Recently there have been proposals for reuse of GSM (SIM) and 3G (AKA) security mechanisms in WLAN. Here are pointers to the specifications and papers describing how GSM/GPRS security can be cracked in real time. The attacks can be used against EAP-SIM where a single SIM is used for both WLAN and WWAN authentication:
EAP-SIM Specification
(Informational, RFC 4186)
Security Analysis of
EAP SIM
Instant
Ciphertext-only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication
Other GSM security
analyses
EAP AKA
(Informational, RFC 4187)
EAP AKA' (Informational, RFC 5448)
3GPP security (AKA)
Authentication protocols supporting cleartext authentication using RADIUS (even within a protected tunnel) are vulnerable to known plaintext attacks. IETF protocols vulnerable to this attack include:
IKEv2 (Proposed
Standard, RFC 4306)
EAP
TTLSv0 (Informational, RFC 5281)
Here are the details of the vulnerability:
HTTP digest over TLS
XAUTH
within IKE
PIC
PANA over
TLS
EAP
TTLSv0 (Informational, RFC 5281)
Microsoft Windows XP SP1
PEAPv0 Implemention
Cisco
PEAPv1 Implementation (Internet Draft, work in progress).
Details of the attacks are described in these papers:
The
Compound Authentication Binding Problem (Internet Draft, work in progress)
Man-in-the-Middle
Attacks in Tunneled Authentication Protocols (Nokia Research Center)
What's Wrong with PIC?
(Presentation to IETF 55 Credentials Workshop)