Last update: June 22, 2009
Lots of people are interested in wireless LAN security nowadays. Given that level of interest, there's a need for accurate information on how the current standards work, what's wrong with them, and the current thinking on how to fix the problems. This site tries to gather relevant papers and standards in a single place.
The Unofficial EAP
Security Web Page
The Unofficial
RADIUS Security Web Page
The Unofficial
802.11 Performance Web Page
The Unofficial
Handoff and Roaming Web Page
The Unofficial
Geographic Location Web Page
IEEE 802.1X "network Port Authentication" was designed to scale with Ethernet, adding no per-packet overhead, and bringing the management technology of dialup networks to the wired and wireless LAN worlds. Here are presentations on the current trends in Ethernet network access, both wired and wireless, and an introduction to IEEE 802.1X and its applications.
Ethernet
Everywhere!
Wireless World 2001 and
BAWUG Presentations on IEEE 802.1X
Here's a presentation on how we do authentication for network access and why this is most often handled at layer 2 (PPP, IEEE 802.1X) rather than at layer 1 (802.11) or at layer 3 (Mobile IP) or higher.
BURP BOF presentation at IETF 50
You've read all about the security problems with WEP. Here are the papers and presentations that lay out the problem.
War Driving
Tools
A
summary presentation on WEP security issues (from 802.11 Tgi)
Berkeley WEP Security
Analysis Presentation (PDF)
Bill Arbaugh's paper on
cracking WEP (PDF)
Fluhrer, Mantin and
Shamir's paper on cracking WEP
Jesse Walker's "Unsafe at
any key length" paper
Possible ways of
improving WEP (near impossible)
The WiFi Alliance (WFA) is now certifying an interim draft of the 802.11 security specification, known as Wi-fi Protected Access (WPA). There are also pre-WPA implementations in the market, some of which have known vulnerabilities. Here are the details of the WPA specification and the known security vulnerabilities:
Details on WPA can be found here:
WPA
Web Site (includes links to the specification)
Microsoft
WPA Support
NDIS WLAN
Objects
Details of WPA security vulnerabilities can be found here:
Issues with Pre-WPA implementations
IEEE 802.11i

The IEEE 802.11i standard was approved in July, 2004. Here are pointers to the specification and its vulnerabilities:
IEEE
802.11i specification (Approved as an IEEE 802.11 Standard)
IEEE
802.11i Overview
NIST Security
Workshop
Details of IEEE 802.11i security vulnerabilities can be found here:
One Message Attack on the 4-way HandshakeIEEE 802.1X is an IEEE standard (approved, June 2001) that enables authentication and key management for IEEE 802 Local Area Networks, including Ethernet, Token Ring, and FDDI. Since the IEEE 802.11 Task Group I security work had only just gotten underway at the time that the IEEE 802.1X standard was approved, 802.1X does not describe how the 802.1X and 802.11 state machines are to be coupled. That task was left to IEEE 802.11 Task Group I.
Since IEEE 802.1X is not a cipher, it is not an alternative to WEP, 3DES, AES, or any other cipher. Since IEEE 802.1X is only focused on authentication and key management, it does not specify how or when security services are to be delivered using the derived keys. However, it can be used to derive authentication and encryption keys for use with any cipher, and can also be used to periodically refresh keys and re-authenticate so as to make sure that the keying material is "fresh".
IEEE 802.1X is not a single authentication method; rather it utilizes Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as its authentication framework. This means that 802.1X-enabled switches and access points can support a wide variety of authentication methods, including certificate-based authentication, smartcards, token cards, one-time passwords, etc. However, the 802.1X specification itself does not specify or mandate any authentication methods. Since switches and access points act as a "pass through" for EAP, new authentication methods can be added without the need to upgrade the switch or access point, by adding software on the host and backend authentication server.
Since IEEE 802.1X doesn't involve encapsulation (unlike PPPOE or VPN) it adds no per-packet overhead and can be implemented on existing switches and access points with no performance impact. This means that IEEE 802.1X can scale from speeds of 11 Mbps (802.11) to 10+ Gbps, and can be enabled on existing switches with a firmware upgrade, without the need to buy new hardware. On hosts, since IEEE 802.1X can be implemented in the NIC driver, support can be enabled by obtaining updating drivers from the NIC vendor; there is no need to install a new operating system.
IEEE 802.1X integrates well with open standards for authentication, authorization and accounting (including RADIUS and LDAP) and so it fits in well with existing infrastructure for managing dialup networks and VPNs. RADIUS servers (including Windows 2000 IAS) that support EAP can be used to manage IEEE 802.1X-based network access.
These specifications describe how IEEE 802.1X works, and how it can be managed via RADIUS and SNMP. Through RADIUS, IEEE 802.1X permits management of authorization on a per-user basis. Per-user services include filtering (layer 2 or layer 3), tunneling, dynamic VLANs, rate limits, etc.
IEEE
802.1X-2004 (Approved as an IEEE 802.1 Standard)
IEEE
802.1X-2004 MIB
IEEE 802.1X-2001 MIB
(IEEE 802 Standard)
IEEE
802.1X-2001 (IEEE 802 Standard)
Some thoughts on diagnosing
problems via the 802.1X MIB
IEEE 802/802.1X Architecture
Issues (Draft, work in progress)
IEEE 802 and IETF communicate regularly relating to IETF dependencies of IEEE 802 working groups. Here is some information relating to the liaison relationship:
IEEE 802 Liaison
Reports to IAB
The IEEE
802/IETF Relationship (Informational)
IEEE 802
Archive Access for IETF WGs
Status of IEEE
802.11i/IETF Liaison (for the NIST 802.11 Security Workshop)
IEEE 802.11 Liaison
letter No. 1
IEEE 802.11 Liaison
letter No. 2
Erik Nordmark's
response to Liaison letter No. 2
IEEE 802.11
Draft Liaison letter No. 3 (not sent)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liason Status Report (March 2003)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (May 2003)
IEEE 802.11/IETF Liaison
Status Report (September 2003)
IEEE 802 request for feedback
on IEEE 802.21 PAR (October 2003)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (January 2004)
IEEE 802/IETF Liaison
Meeting Summary (January 2004)
IEEE 802.1/IETF Liaison
Meeting Summary (January 2004)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Meeting Summary (January 2004)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (May 2004)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (July 2004)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (November 2004)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (January 2005)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (March 2005)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (May 2005)
3GPP liaison request to IEEE
802.11 on RADIUS/Diameter Coexistence (September 2003)
IEEE 802.11 Response to 3GPP
liaison request on RADIUS/Diameter Coexistence (September 2003)
IEEE 802.11 Liaison letter
No. 4 (February 2004)
GSMA Request to IETF relating
to RADIUS WLAN Support
WFA Request to IETF relating
to RADIUS WLAN Support
IEEE 802.11 Liaison Letter
relating to Network Discovery
Input
to IETF from IEEE 802.11 WIEN (September 2004)
Input
to IETF from IEEE 802.11 WIEN (November 2004)
Liaison
to IETF from IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.21 (May 2005)
Liaison to IETF from
IEEE 802.16 (April 2005)
Liaison to IETF from
IEEE 802.16 (May 2005)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (September 2005)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (November 2005)
Liaison
to IETF from IEEE 802.11u (November 2005)
IEEE
802.11u Requirements (November 2005)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (January 2006)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (March 2006)
IEEE
802.11/IETF Liaison Status Report (May 2006)
IEEE 802.11 Review of PANA Framework Document (May 2006)
IEEE 802.11 Response to PANA Interpretation Request (May 2006)
You've probably heard "experts" say that "VPN is the answer to WEP security problems." Well, it isn't that simple -- because the next question is "whose VPN?" Almost all IPsec tunnel mode products shipping today are proprietary, interoperability is poor and many of the proprietary extensions have security flaws. Here are the references to the security analyses of VPN protocols as well as to the IETF standards for VPN. Ask your vendors when they plan to implement the IETF standards!
Security analysis of
PPTPv2
Security
analysis of PPTP
Microsoft
point of view on PPTP
Security analysis of XAUTH (shipping
in most IPsec tunnel mode implementations)
Man-in-the-middle
attacks against IPsec VPNs (also SSH, HTTPS, etc.)
Configuration of IPsec tunnel mode
with DHCPv4 (Proposed Standard, RFC 3456)
Securing L2TP with IPsec (Proposed
Standard, RFC 3193)
Legacy
authentication within IPsec tunnel mode (PIC) (Internet Draft, work in
progress)
IPsec-NAT
compatibility requirements (Informational, RFC 3715)
Recently, there has been a lot of interest in the application of certificates to WLAN authentication. Here are some presentations and papers on the subject:
IETF 55 Enrollment Workshop
Certificate-based
roaming (Internet Draft, work in progress)
Certificate
hierarchy for the WLAN industry (presentation to IEEE 802.11 Tgi)
WLAN certificate extensions (Proposed
Standard, RFC 4334)
Why Certificate OIDs are
needed
PEAPOD
proposal for EAP-based enrollment